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Abstract— By simulating four quantum key distribution (QKD)
experiments and analyzing one decoy-state QKD experiment, we
compare two data post-processing schemes based on security
against individual attack by Lu¨tkenhaus, and unconditional secu-
rity analysis by Gottesman-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill. Our results
show that these two schemes yield close performances. Since the
Holy Grail of QKD is its unconditional security, we conclude that
one is better off considering unconditional security, rather than
restricting to individual attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1], [2] allows two parties,
a transmitter Alice and a receiver Bob, to create a random
secret key even when the channel is accessible to an eaves-
dropper, Eve. The security of QKD is built on the fundamental
laws of physics in contrast to existing classical public key
encryption schemes that are based on unproven computational
assumptions. The unconditional security of the idealized QKD
system has been proven in the past decade [3], [4], [5], [6].
In Shor-Preskill’s proof [5], two steps of data post-
processing, error correction and privacy amplification, need to
be performed in order to distill a secret key. Error correction
ensures that Alice and Bob share an identical key, while
privacy amplification removes Eve’s information about the
final key. Alice and Bob can simply estimate the quantum
bit error rate (QBER) by error testing and then perform error
correction. Privacy amplification, on the other hand, requires
the phase error rate which cannot be measured directly without
a quantum computer. When an idealized QKD system is
used, due to the symmetry of BB84, one can assume the
phase error rate to be the same as the QBER [5]. However,
any real QKD setup is not ideal but with imperfect sources,
noisy channels and inefficient detectors, which will affect the
security. To do security analysis, we should take these effects
into consideration.
A few theoretical works have been done to deal with
the imperfect devices, such as [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12],
[13]. We will compare Lu¨tkenhaus’ analysis [8] which deals
with individual attacks and Gottesman-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill
(GLLP) [13] unconditional security proof. For convenience,
we name the data post-procesing schemes, based on these two
security analyses, after Lu¨tkenhaus and GLLP.
Meanwhile, many QKD experiments [14], [15], [16], [17],
[18] have been performed in the past decade. Experimentalists
sometimes use the QBER as the only criterion for the security
of QKD. However, after taking the imperfections into consid-
eration, this kind of security analysis is incomplete. In fact,
due to photon-number splitting (PNS) attacks [19], [9], [20],
Eve can successfully break down the security even when the
QBER is 0%.
Decoy states have been proposed as a useful method for sub-
stantially improving the performance of QKD with coherent
sources [21]. The security proof of decoy-state QKD is given
in Ref. [22]. Afterwards, some practical decoy-state protocols
are proposed [23], [24], [25]. Recently, a few decoy-state QKD
experiments have been performed [26], [27], [28], [29]. In this
paper, we will consider both decoy-state and non-decoy-state
cases.
The goal of this paper is to compare the two standard
security proof results—Lu¨tkenhaus and GLLP. We find that for
realistic experimental parameters, with or without decoy states,
the two security proof results give similar key generation
rate and secure distance. Since unconditional security is the
Holy Grail of QKD and GLLP (but not Lu¨tkenhaus) gives
unconditional security, our conclusion is that one should use
GLLP as the standard criterion for security.
In Section II we review a widely used QKD model to real
experiments. In Section III, we will compare two data post-
processing schems, Lu¨tkenhaus and GLLP for non-decoy and
decoy-state QKD.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Here we use a QKD model following [8], see also [25]. We
do not repeat the details of the model here. To reproduce the
simulation results, one may need to refer to Section II of [25].
The procedure of a QKD experiment, using BB84 protocol
with coherent state, is as follows:
1) In total, Alice sends Bob N pulses for QKD, containing
Nµ pulses for key transmission (signal states) and N −
Nµ pulses for error testing or decoy states. In the Nµ
signal pulses, Alice and Bob have Nsµ pulses using same
bases (after basis reconciliation).
2) Within the Nsµ pulses, Bob gets a sifted key with a length
of Ksµ, where they measure the same bases and Bob gets
detections.
3) Alice and Bob choose a security analysis and perform a
data post-processing scheme.
Here we assume Alice uses a weak coherent state for key
transmission. Define the expected photon number (intensity)
of the weak coherent state as µ.
Define q = Nsµ/N . In BB84 scheme, q = 1/2 when N →
∞. Here subscript µ is the expected photon number of the
coherent light used for key transmission as defined above.
Define the gain Qµ = Ksµ/Nsµ, the probability for Bob to
get a detection in a pulse that Alice and Bob use the same
basis.
Define the QBER Eµ = Kerrµ /Ksµ, the probability for Bob
to get a wrong detection in a pulse that Alice and Bob use the
2same basis. Here Kerrµ is the number of erroneous bits in the
sifted key.
Alice knows what N and µ she uses for the key transmis-
sion. Nsµ and Ksµ can be directly counted from the data after
the key transmission. Alice and Bob can estimate QBER from
error testing, or they can count Kerrµ after error correction. In
fact, even without knowing the real QBER, they can directly
apply a error correction scheme (e.g., the Cascade scheme
[30]). If the error correction is successful, then it automatically
provides the QBER, otherwise they restart the QKD. Thus, in
a real QKD system, Alice and Bob may skip the error testing
part.
Assuming that the phase of each pulse is totally randomized,
the photon number of each pulse follows a Poisson distribution
with a parameter µ as its expected photon number. We remark
that the phase randomization procedure is crucial for the
security of QKD [31]. The density matrix of the state emitted
by Alice is given by
ρA =
∞∑
i=0
µi
i!
e−µ |i〉〈i|, (1)
where |0〉〈0| is the vacuum state and |i〉〈i| is the i-photon
state for i = 1, 2 · · · . The states with only one photon (i = 1)
are called single photon states. The states with more than one
photon (i ≥ 2) are called multi photon states.
Define Yi to be the yield of an i-photon state, i.e., the
conditional probability of a detection event at Bob’s detector
given that Alice sends out an i-photon state. Note that Y0 is
the background rate including detector dark counts and other
background contributions such as the stray light in the fiber.
Consequently, define the error rate of i-photon state to be ei.
The gain of i-photon states Qi is given by
Qi = Yi
µi
i!
e−µ. (2)
When i = 1, Q1 and e1 are the gain and error rate of single
photon states. Note that Eve has the ability to change {Yi} and
{ei} as she wishes, but she cannot change µ, which is set by
Alice. Decoy states allow Alice and Bob to estimate channel
transmittance and error rate accurately, which will restrict the
Eve’s freedom to adjust {Yi} and {ei}. This is the key reason
why decoy states are useful for QKD [22].
III. DATA POST-PROCESSING SCHEMES
In this section, we will compare two data post-processing
schemes, Lu¨tkenhaus versus GLLP. During the comparison,
we will apply two data post-processing schemes to both non-
decoy and decoy state QKD.
A. Lu¨tkenhaus versus GLLP
Here we compare data post-processing schemes based
on two security analyses, Lu¨tkenhaus [8] and GLLP [13].
Lu¨tkenhaus scheme focuses on security against individual
attacks, while GLLP scheme proves unconditional security.
In the GLLP [13], there are so called tagged qubits in the
discussion. The basis information of tagged qubits is somehow
revealed to Eve. Thus tagged qubits are insecure for QKD. The
idea is that Alice and Bob can (in principle) separate the qubits
into two groups, tagged and untagged qubits, hence they only
need to perform privacy amplification to the untagged qubits.
The reason is as follows. The final key will be bitwise XOR
of keys that could be obtained from the tagged and untagged
qubits. If the key from untagged qubits is private and random,
then it doesn’t matter if Eve knows everything about tagged
qubits — the sum is still private and random.
Based on the tagged qubit idea, the procedure of the data
post-processing is as follows. First, Alice and Bob perform
the error correction, and if it is successfully done, they share
an identical key. And then they calculate how much privacy
amplification they should do (according to certain security
analysis, which we will discuss soon). Finally they use random
hashing (or other privacy amplification procedure) to get a final
secure key.
Due to PNS attack, we can regard qubits single photon states
as untagged qubits and those from other (vacuum and multi
photon) states as tagged qubits. Then we can compare the
results of Lu¨tkenhaus and GLLP schemes. We can rewrite the
formula of the key generation rate by Lu¨tkenhaus scheme
R ≥ q{−QµH2(Eµ) +Q1[1− log2(1 + 4e1 − 4e
2
1)]}. (3)
Similarly, as given in Eq. (11) in [22], we rewrite the key rate
formula of GLLP
R ≥ q{−QµH2(Eµ) +Q1[1−H2(e1)]} (4)
where Q1 and e1 are the gain and error rate of single photon
states, and H2(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the
binary entropy function. Alice and Bob need to estimate Q1
and e1 given the data from QKD experiments.
In both Eqs. (3) and (4), the first term in the bracket
is for error correction and the second one is for privacy
amplification. The privacy amplification is only performed on
the single photon part. In this manner, Lu¨tkenhaus [8] has
already applied the tagged qubits idea.
Here due to PNS attacks [19], [9], [20], both Lu¨tkenhaus
and GLLP assume that the single photon states are the only
source of untagged qubits for BB84. This may not true for
other protocols. For example, in SARG04 [32], [33], two-
photon states can be used to extract secure keys.
Here is the key point of the whole paper. The difference
between the Lu¨tkenhaus and GLLP results appears in the
privacy amplification part. We compare H2(e) with log2(1 +
4e1 − 4e
2
1) in Fig. 1. We can see that the difference of two
functions are quite small. For this reason, in fact, Lu¨tkenhaus
and GLLP give very similar result in the key generation rate
and distance of secure QKD. In what follows, we will illustrate
this crucial point with examples of experimental parameters
from previous QKD experiments. Our conclusion holds with
and without using decoy states.
B. Non-decoy-state QKD
Without decoy states, Alice and Bob have to pessimistically
assume that all losses and errors come from single photon
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Fig. 1. GLLP vs. Lu¨tkenhaus. The maximal deviation of two curves is
15.36% when the error rate is 3.85%.
states. Thus
Q1 = Qµ − pM
e1 =
QµEµ
Q1
(5)
where pM = 1− (1+µ) exp(−µ) is the probability that Alice
sends out a multi photon state. We can recover Eq. (15) in [8]
by substituting Eq. (5) into Eq. (3). Let ∆ = pM/Qµ, we can
recover Eq. (50) in [13] by substituting Eq. (5) into Eq. (4).
We compare the key generation rate of two data post-
processing schemes based on Lu¨tkenhaus and GLLP by sim-
ulating four experiment setups [15], [16], [17], [18]. The key
parameters are listed in TABLE I.
T8[15] G13[16] KTH[17] GYS[18]
λ [nm] 830 1300 1550 1550
α [dB/km] 2.5 0.32 0.2 0.21
ed [%] 1 0.14 1 3.3
Y0 [/pulse] 10−7 1.64× 10−4 4× 10−4 1.7× 10−6
ηBob [%] 7.92 8.14 14.30 4.5
TABLE I
Key parameters from four QKD experiment setups.
Fig. 2 shows the relationship between key generation rate
and the transmission distance, comparing two data post-
processing schemes, Lu¨tkenhaus and GLLP. For both schemes,
we consider non-decoy state QKD. From Fig. 2, we can see
that the key generation rate of GLLP is only slightly lower than
that of Lu¨tkenhaus. Here we emphasize that GLLP deals with
the general attack, while Lu¨tkenhaus is restricted to individual
attack.
We remark that the QBERs (Eµ’s) of four GLLP curves
at maximal distances in Fig. 2 are 4.57%, 4.80%, 4.80% and
4.34%. Clearly it is far away from 11%, the tolerable QBER
given in [5]. This is due to the fact that the QKD source is
weak coherent state, while the security proof given in [5] is
based on single photon source.
Many of QKD experiments used µ = 0.1 as for key
transmission. If using µ = 0.1 for GYS [18] setup, we find that
Qµ < pM for all transmission distances. That is, for BB84,
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Fig. 2. shows the relationship between key generation rate and the
transmission distance, comparing two data post-processing schemes based on
Lu¨tkenhaus and GLLP security analyses. The key parameters are listed in
TABLE I. Here we consider non-decoy case and use the optimal expected
photon number µ = η [8]. Using Cascade protocol [30], the error correction
efficiency is 1.16. Details of the QKD simulation model appear in [25].
Eve can successfully perform PNS attacks [19], [9], [20] and
obtain all the information about the key even when the QBER
is 0%!
C. Decoy-state QKD
Here, we will give a data post-processing scheme following
the security analysis of decoy state QKD [22].
In Eqs. (3) and (4), q and Qµ can be directly counted from
Bob’s detection events. The QBER Eµ can be obtained from
error testing or after error correction step. Alice and Bob can
estimate Q1 and e1 with decoy states. Definitions of these
variables are in Section II.
As for Vacuum+Weak decoy state scheme [25], besides Qµ
and Eµ discussed in Section II, Alice and Bob will use Qvac
(from the vacuum decoy), Qν and Eν (from the weak decoy).
The definitions are similar as Qµ and Eµ in Section II. The
intensity of weak decoy state is ν. Alice and Bob can publicly
compare all weak decoy states to get Qν and Eν . They can
estimate the background count rate by vacuum decoy states
Y0 = Qvac. Then, they apply the formulas, Eq. (35) and
Eq. (37) in [25], for the estimations of Q1 and e1
Q1 ≥
µ2e−µ
µν − ν2
(Qνe
ν −Qµe
µ ν
2
µ2
−
µ2 − ν2
µ2
Y0)
e1 ≤
EνQνe
ν − e0Y0
Q1eµν/µ
,
(6)
where e0 = 1/2 is the error rate of vacuum decoy states.
In summary, the data post-processing for decoy state QKD
is
1) Alice announces to Bob which pulses are used for decoy
states. They publicly compare all values of decoy states,
and then calculate Qvac, Qν and Eν .
2) They sacrifice f(Eµ)H(Eµ) part of the sifted key to do
the error correction. Here f(Eµ) is the error correction
efficiency.
43) Alice and Bob estimate the gain Q1 and error rate e1 of
single photon states, using Eq. (6) with Y0 = Qvac, Qν
and Eν .
4) They calculate the final key rate R by Eq. (3) or (4).
According to R, they perform privacy amplification (say,
random hashing) to get a final secure key with length of
NR, where N the total number of pulses sent by Alice
defined in Section II.
We remark that in principle Alice and Bob can use decoy
states to generate keys, but in practice it is more efficient
if Alice and Bob compare all bit values of decoy states
to minimize the statistical fluctuation. In other words, there
always exists one optimal intensity for QKD and we use it
for signal states. Suppose some of the decoy state pulses are
used for key generation; it will be more efficient to transmit
these pulses using the signal (optimal) intensity. Thus, only
the signal pulses are used for key generation.
Note that for a finite length QKD, Alice and Bob need to
consider statistical fluctuations. A similar procedure will still
be applicable. The only difference will be the formulas for
estimations of Q1 and e1. Statistical fluctuations are discussed
in [23], [25]. As mentioned in [25], a rough way to estimate
the statistical fluctuations is assuming Gaussian distribution of
Qν , Eν and Y0. Take the lower bound of Qν and Y0 and the
upper bound of Eν to estimate Q1 and e1. Other procedures
are the same as used above. For simplicity, here we skip the
statistical fluctuations.
Note that the efficiency of error correction and privacy
amplification can also be included into Eq. (3) and (4). In
our simulations, we only consider the efficiency of error
correction.
The comparison of Lu¨tkenhaus and GLLP for decoy-state
QKD is shown in Fig. 3. From the figure, we can see that the
performance of two schemes are very close when decoy states
are used.
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Fig. 3. shows the relationship between key generation rate and the
transmission distance for decoy state QKD, comparing Lu¨tkenhaus and GLLP.
The key parameters are listed in TABLE I. Using the Cascade protocol [30],
the error correction efficiency is 1.16. Here we assume the efficiency of privacy
amplification is 1. Details of QKD simulations can be seen in [25].
For comparison, we list the QBERs of four GLLP curves
at maximal distance in Fig. 3 are 5.19%, 4.21%, 5.11% and
6.8%. We can see that these four values are close to those given
by Fig. 2 of non-decoy state QKD. This is because stronger
signals are allowed to use when decoy states are implemented,
and then the QBER drops down, which cancels out the increase
of QBER by higher channel loss.
Based on the simulation results of four QKD setups, we find
that there is little to gain by restricting the security analysis
to individual attacks, given that the two schemes—Lu¨tkenhaus
vs. GLLP—provide very close performances. In other words,
our view is that one is better off considering unconditional
security, rather than restricting to individual attacks.
D. One example
Decoy state QKD experiments has recently been performed
[26], [27], [28], [29]. We analyze a decoy state QKD exper-
iment over 60km fiber experiment [27] as an example here.
All raw experiment data are listed in TABLE II.
Distance λ N Nvac Kvac
60km 1550nm 104.8Mb 16.63Mb 1033b
µ Nµ N
s
µ K
s
µ K
err
µ
0.55 66.86Mb 33.40Mb 60.50kb 1845b
ν Nν N
s
ν K
s
ν K
err
ν
0.152 21.34Mb 10.69Mb 5397b 455b
TABLE II
Raw QKD experiment parameters from [27]. The unit b stands for bit.
From TABLE II, we can calculate the key parameters for
security analysis, listed in TABLE III. The definitions are
given in Section II.
q Qµ Eµ Y0 = Qvac Qν
0.319 1.81× 10−3 3.05% 1.11× 10−4 5.47× 10−4
TABLE III
Key parameters for the security analysis of [27] derived from TABLE II.
Now, we can apply the data post-processing for decoy state
QKD. We can estimate Q1 by Eq. (6). For e1 we use a different
formula
e1 ≤
EµQµe
µ − e0Y0
Q1eµ
. (7)
The reason is that in the real experiment [27], e1 of decoy
states deviates largely from that of signal states. The deviation
is caused by the imperfections of attenuators. Thus, we use the
QBER of signal states Eµ to estimate e1. It reminds us the key
assumption of decoy state QKD: all Yi and ei are the same in
the signal states and in the decoy states [22].
Substituting parameters of TABLE III into Eqs. (6) and (7),
we get Q1 ≥ 8.50×10−4 and e1 ≤ 2.73%. Then we apply the
Cascade error correction scheme [30], sacrificing a fraction of
1.16H2(Eµ) = 0.486 of the sifted key, where 1.16 is the error
correction efficiency. Then from Eqs. (3) and (4), we get the
key generation rate RLutkenhaus = 9.98×10−5 and RGLLP =
9.04× 10−5 . We randomly choose parities and obtain a final
key with length of KLutkenhaus = NRLutkenhaus = 10.5kbit
and KGLLP = NRGLLP = 9.47kbit . We can see the
5difference between the key lengths of GLLP and Lu¨tkenhaus is
within 10%. For the case of considering statistical fluctuations,
one can refer to [27].
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we compare the security analysis of
Lu¨tkenhaus, against individual attack, and Gottesman-Lo-
Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill, general security analysis. Our simulation
results show that these two schemes provide close perfor-
mances. Thus, we conclude that one is better off considering
unconditional security, rather than restricting to individual
attacks. In the security analysis, we emphasize that the QBER
is not the only criterion of security due to the imperfections
of QKD setups.
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